Analyzing International Constitutions In Order To Identify The Right To Food, Coupled With A Jurisprudential Analysis On The Counter Productivity Of Employing Equality
School of Law, Christ University, Bengaluru
The ideal of plentiful resources and access to the same is particularly fanciful to the largest proportion of any given population set within society. There appears to exist a particular orientation that posits the principle that all human beings irrespective of any peculiarities such as race, caste, religion or gender must have the inherent right to equal access to society’s basic resources, a conception of utopian equality. The idea of equal access emerges the conception of a basic right to food that people possess. (amongst rights to other basic necessities) At a secondary level, what much be considered, is that constitutions that function as basic norms or the founding principles of law in a particular state, usually are texts of explicit and unquestionable authority on the issues of equality and the rights that arise theoretically from the same. Thereby restricting the discussion to constitutional perspectives on the inherent right to food possessed by the people belonging to the human race, this paper seeks to analyse the constitutions of different countries around the world in order to ascertain whether there exists any form of consensus between them on the issue at hand and the measures taken to guarantee such a right. At an ancillary level, the paper has two aims and they are – firstly, to assess the global implementation of a right, in those countries where it is theoretically guaranteed and secondly, to present arguments pertinent to the idea that, a right to food is at a principle level an ideal construct that is existent as a reaction to the functional problem presented by the premise of liberty within a society of multiple individuals/variables and hence cannot be sustainable.
 ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44; Westen 1990, pp. 39, 120)
 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed. 1960)
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (4th edition ed. 1869). – Chapter I: Introductory remarks
 Additionally, it is also stipulated that, following from the conclusion of non – sustainability, the paper seeks to present a scenario wherein it would be sustainable provided a certain degree of economic progress has been achieved.