

The Ordinance Making Power of the Executive and Constitution: In Light of Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar

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Power to promulgate ordinances is a Constitutional function designed to ensure effective working of the state and to minimize delay in state functioning when the legislature is not in session. There has been a growing concern among spheres of power including pillars of democracy regarding demarcation of power. The misuse of any Constitutional provisions cannot be tolerated as it is a sharp breach in to the imperative democratic structure of the Nation. Ordinance making power is bestowed up on the executive as a substitute tool if procedure for enactment of law become rendered impossible, the nature of ordinance only should be exposed if the legislature is not in session causing impossibility for executive for implementing governance policies or functions. The concern regarding this provision have been raised in various legal spheres contributing to the evolution of this doctrine without generating inclination towards any of the single pillars of democracy, this is important so as to preserve the governance system of India. The topic of ordinance has been subjected to thorough study in this research paper following the path of judicial evolution of doctrine underlining the corresponding effects of the same. The recent judgement by Apex court in Krishna Kumar Singh case is analysed to its fullest to create deeper understanding of the topic and paper is concluded by looking in to the present evolved position which deems the existence of a system of ordinance in full spirit of Indian Constitution.

History of Ordinances

Ordinance is in paper a presidential power, which was established during the British era through the enactment of Government of India Act, 1935¹. Section 42 and 43 of the said act dealt with ordinance making power of the Governor General which states that, 'If circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to

take immediate action', then only he can use this power. Organizers of Constitution have made a course of action in which powers are isolated from the three wings of government. The Legislatures are entrusted with the essential occupation of administering. The official is entrusted with overseeing the nation by implementing the laws made by the governing bodies. Lastly, the legal part is to translate the laws and to ensure that they are being taken after and wherever required, audit them to guarantee that they are unavoidably consistent. Thus, official's energy to declare statute conflicts with the embodiment of this game plan. It neither acts a check nor as an adjust on the expert practiced by alternate wings of the legislature. Article 123² of the Indian Constitution grants the President of India certain law making powers i.e. to promulgate ordinance when either houses are not in session or it is impossible for one house to enact or pass a law. Ordinances may relate to any subject that parliament has the power to make law, and would be having same limitations. Thus, the following limitations exist-

When legislature is not in session: The President may promulgate ordinance.

Immediate action is needed: the president though has the power of promulgating the ordinances but same cannot be done unless he is satisfied that there are circumstances require him to take immediate action.

Parliament should approve: after the ordinance has been passed it is required to be approved by the parliament within six weeks of reassembling. The same will cease to operate if disapproved by either house.

The President may withdraw an ordinance at any time. However, he exercises his power with the consent of the Council of Ministers headed by the President. Ordinances may have prospective or retrospective effect which may modify, repeal existing act or other ordinances. Ordinances promulgated from year 1950-2008, are overwhelming in the areas of Finance, Labour, Commerce and Industry, Home Affair and law and Justice. Out of these a very few of them can be classified under actual emergencies, and hence necessary as a constitutional obligation. The up-going pattern was turned around by the Janata Dal which amid their three-year term of administration declared just 34 Ordinances from 1977-1979. The following two governments had proclaimed a normal number of 10 Ordinances for each year. The Narasimha Rao Government from year 1991-1996 had declared a normal of 21 statutes for every year and none of the mandate had ever managed either the debasement trick or with the predominant political shakiness. Truth be told none of them were re-presented as Bill in the parliament. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government from year 1998-2004 had proclaimed a normal of 14.6 Ordinances for every year

¹ Government of India Act, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf (last visited Apr 28, 2018).

² MP JAIN, ARTICLE 123 INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7 ed. 2014).

and later the UPA Government from year 2004-2009 had declared a normal of 6.8 Ordinances for each year³.

Satisfaction of the President

One of the basics to be remembered while passing a mandate is that the President ought to be fulfilled; that conditions exist that requires quick activities on part of the President. The summit court has not yet characterized 'fulfilment of the President' and much whether the subjective fulfilment of the President can be addressed in the Court of Law. To unmistakably clear up the said vagueness, Indira Gandhi drove Government passed the 38th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1975 which has explicitly barred the subjective fulfilment of the President outside the domain of Judicial Review. Assist in 44th (Amendment) Act, 1978 erased this proviso, holding that the energy of President could be tested in the Court of Law on the off chance that it depends on lacking honesty, degenerate rationale or had any mala fide expectation.

On account of A.K. Roy v. Association of India⁴, the Supreme Court held that the subjective fulfilment of the President isn't totally non-justifiable. Later if there should be an occurrence of Venkata Reddy v. Province of Andhra Pradesh⁵, the Apex court over ruled its own particular choice and held that the Satisfaction of the President can't be brought being referred to in the Court of law and is out of Judicial Review.

Out of 615 Ordinances, a normal of 214 Ordinances were declared only 15 days before the Parliament should be in session while 261 were proclaimed inside 15 days, when Parliament was finishing its session. A standout amongst the most unbelievable moves was Indira Gandhi's turn to nationalize Banks through an Ordinance issued by her.

Judicial Evolution of the Notion

On account of R.C. Copper v. Association of India⁶, constitution legitimacy of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971 was tested which shortened the privilege of property of an individual and allowed the obtaining of the same by the legislature for the general population use, on the instalment of pay which must be dictated by the Parliament and not by the official courtroom. In the Bank Nationalization case, Supreme Court while looking in to constitutionality of Banking Companies Ordinance Act, 1969 which had tried to nationalize 14 banks in India, it was held that President choice can be tested on the ground that no 'prompt activity' was required on his part.

On account of A.K. Roy v. Association of India⁷, the Supreme Court while inspecting the dependability of the National Security Ordinance, 1980 which was issued

to accommodate preventive detainment in specific cases, the Supreme Court contended that the President's energy of making Ordinances isn't past the Judicial Review of the court. Be that as it may, the Court was not able investigate the issues of the case further as the law of the President was supplanted by an Act. The court additionally indicated out the need practice legal audit over the President's choice just at considerable grounds and not generally at each 'easy-going test'. On account of S.K.G.Sugar Ltd v. Territory of Bihar⁸, it was held that proclaiming of an Ordinance by the Governor is simply upon the Subjective Satisfaction of him and he is the sole Judge to consider the need to issue the Ordinance and "his fulfilment isn't a justifiable issue". On account of T. Venkata Reddy v. Province of Andhra Pradesh⁹, the applicant tested the sacred legitimacy of the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordinances, 1984. One of the grounds was that the Ordinance is void because of the absence of mind utilized by the Governor and from the initiation of the same the state lawmaking body was objecting it. The mandate is said to produce results when it is proclaimed by the President and stops to work by the authoritative demonstration.

One of the inquiries which were brought up in the previously mentioned case by the court was: 'regardless of whether the legitimacy of an Ordinance passed can be tried upon the comparative grounds as to those on which an official or legal activity is tried'. In noting the inquiry the Supreme Court referred to its own prior judgment given in K.Nagaraj v. Province of Karnataka¹⁰, and held that the Power of making Ordinances is an administrative activity so an indistinguishable grounds from identified with the law making ought to be tested than testing the official or legal grounds. Encourage on account of S.R. Bommai v. Association of India¹¹, for this situation the extent of Judicial Review was extended as to where the court told that where the activity by the President is taken without the important materials, the same would fall under the classification of "clearly unreasonable" and the activity would be thought to be in lacking honesty. The Supreme Court held that the activity of energy by the President under the Article 356(1) to issue decree is Justifiable and subject to Judicial Review to challenge on the ground of mala fide.

If there should be an occurrence of State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose¹², the court held that the rights and commitments which are made by the Ordinance became effective when the Ordinance is proclaimed and the same can't be stifled until the point that an appropriate lawmaking body by an administrative body smothers those rights and commitments of the Ordinances. Notwithstanding, where the Ordinances declared is a manhandle of energy and a sort of Fraud on

³ Reference Division Library & Reference, Research, Documentation and Information Service (LARRDIS) Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Presidential ordinances*, 2015, at 9-108.

⁴ (1982) 1 SCC 271

⁵ (1985) 3 SCC 198

⁶ 1970 AIR 564

⁷ 1982 AIR 710

⁸ 1977 4 SCC 827; p. 832

⁹ 1985 AIR 724

¹⁰ 1993 SC (4) 27

¹¹ AIR 1994 SC1918;p. 1969-70.

¹² 1962 AIR 945

the constitution, at that point, the state winning with such declaration ought to instantly restore.

A statute would be made open to challenge on the accompanying grounds:

- It constitutes colourable enactment;
- It contradicts any of the Fundamental Rights as specified in our Constitution;
- It is violative of substantive arrangements of Our Constitution,
- Its reflectively is unlawful. Laws are however confined by the official body which is said to be a solitary, bound together substance.

The President is the leader of the official body who declare laws on the guidance of the committee of pastors. The most imperative prerequisite of the proclamation of the laws is the 'need to make the quick move'. At that point there will be no trouble in finding out the fulfilment of the President when there is genuine need or need in proclaiming the Ordinances. In assist the instance of *D.C. Wadhwa v. Territory of Bihar*¹³, the State of Bihar's proclaiming and re-declaring statutes were tested as there was declaration of the same in "huge scale". Between the year 1967-81, 256 laws were declared and after that re-proclaimed and some among them stay into reality for up to 14 years. Boss Justice P.N. Bhagwati watched:

"The ability to make a law is to meet an unprecedented circumstance and it ought not be made to meet political finishes of a person. In spite of the fact that it is in opposition to fair standard for an official to make a law yet this power is given to the President to meet crises so it ought to be constrained in some purpose of time." Despite the fact that the sheer wickedness in mandate making energy of the President had constrained the Apex Court to play out some legal audit, there is still no lucidity on the nature and degree of the legal survey of the court over the statutes made by the President or the Governor.

Krishna Kumar Singh Case: A Review of Misused Necessity

A seven judge seat of the Supreme Court as of late passed a judgment in *Krishna Kumar Singh and Another v Province of Bihar and Others*, holding that moves made under a mandate won't really survive if the mandate slips by or stops to work. It has been a current pattern in different states in India and in addition at a Central Government level for the government to look to force laws without going through the unavoidably recommended system of having Parliament or the law-making body pass the laws; the administration looks to bypass this method by issuing laws. *Krishna Kumar Singh* is in this way, up to a great degree noteworthy judgment, since it considers whether such laws, relevant to all people, organizations and associations, can make enduring rights. The useful effect of this judgment is that the privileges of people and organizations under any law issued by the administration may not be changeless and

may endure for the length of the law. Unless the law-making body sanctions a statute fusing an indistinguishable right from are accessible under the law, there is dependably a possibility that the rights may subside once the mandate slips. To give a case of what this implies practically speaking, we can take a gander at the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (Alteration) Ordinance, 2017. This mandate gives (in addition to other things) that specific classifications of land in Maharashtra will be considered to be changed over to various utilizations if duty indicated in the mandate have been paid in regard of such land. The result of the *Krishna Kumar Singh* judgment is that any such esteemed change of land under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 may not be lasting – the land may return to its prior status after the law stops to work, unless the terms of the law are hence fused in a statute.

The challenge over the utilization of statutes as an instrument to make laws extends well past the Constitution's reception. In reality, when the arrangements fusing these forces were discussed in the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar recommended that any worries over the conferment of law making powers on the official were extremely just a bandy over dialect. "My own particular inclination is that a solid purpose behind the notion of antagonistic vibe, which has been communicated by my fair Friend, Mr. H.V. Kamath and also my respectable Friend, Mr. H.N. Kunzru, truly emerges by the disastrous heading of the Chapter 'Administrative Powers of the President'," Ambedkar said. "It should be 'Energy to administer when Parliament isn't in session'. I think if that kind of harmless heading was given to the Chapter, a great part of the hatred to this arrangement will fade away. Indeed. The word 'Mandate' is an awful word, however in the event that Mr. Kamath with his rich creative energy can recommend a superior word, I will be the principal individual to acknowledge it. I don't care for the word 'mandate', yet I can't locate some other to substitute it."

However, had Ambedkar been around to witness the methodical destroying of the sacred reason for the mandate making power by late governments at both the Central and State levels, it is likely that he may have denied his before assessment. It's presently evident that the issue in the utilization of statutes curves a long way past insignificant semantics. It goes, truth be told, as *Shubhankar Dam*, an educator of law, and a writer of a current book on mandates, has contended, to the very foundation of the power's conferment. This is on account of, from various perspectives, the provisos considering the ability to make laws are an exception in our established structure.

The originators' point was dependably to force a partition of energy between the three perceived wings of government. In this game plan, the governing body (Parliament at the Centre, and the Assemblies and the Councils in the States) is entrusted with the essential employment of making laws; the official's part is to control the nation by upholding these laws; and the legal

¹³ 1987 AIR 579

translates the laws, checks whether they are being taken after, and, where required, audits them to guarantee that they are unavoidably consistent. The official's energy to issue mandates, in this manner, conflicts with this general grain of charge; for it acts neither as a check nor as an adjust on the specialist practiced by alternate branches of government.¹⁴ It's similarly clear even from the exposed content of the Constitution that the expert to issue statutes is to be utilized just to meet the eminent requests of remarkable circumstances. Article 123, which characterizes the mandate making energy of the Union official, expresses that when the two Houses of Parliament are not in session, if the President is fulfilled that "conditions exist which render it essential for him to make prompt move, he may declare such Ordinance as the conditions appear to him to require". It additionally gives that any law might have an indistinguishable power and impact from a statute of Parliament, if it is laid before the two Houses. In addition, the law so made will "stop to work at the termination of a month and a half from the reassembly of Parliament", or if Parliament whenever before the finish of the period passes resolutions objecting to the law. In about indistinguishable terms, Article 213 of the Constitution puts on the Governor, following up on the guidance of the Council of Ministers of his State, the ability to pass statutes on subjects of State specialist.

By and by, be that as it may, statutes have barely been utilized as a simply excellent measure. Most as of late, the Central official had issued a law in 2014, which it in this way re promulgated three times without endorsement, to upset huge advantages ensured by the land securing law established by Parliament in 2013. Their point obviously was to sidestep the popularity based necessities of contention and consultation, and to beat numerical inadequacies that they looked in the Rajya Sabha. What the administration was doing, thusly, was to utilize its mandate making power as essentially an elective device of enactment. It was a comparable manhandle of energy that had been set under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court for its examination in Krishna Kumar Singh. Here being referred to were a progression of statutes go by the legislature of Bihar through which the State tried to assume control over exactly 429 Sanskrit schools, moving in the process the administrations of the considerable number of instructors and different representatives of the schools to the State government. The primary statute, which was issued in 1989, was trailed by a progression of five mandates, none of which was put before the State assembly. Eventually, the administration neglected to sanction a statute affirming the terms of the mandates, and the remainder of them was permitted to pass on April 30, 1992. The workers of the schools, who stood released from benefit, because of the end of the mandates, prosecuted the State government. At the point when the case at last achieved the seven-judge seat for contentions there were two basic inquiries to be replied: regardless of whether the laws issued by the Bihar government were naturally

legitimate, and whether the solicitors had inferred any lawful right that survived the end of the laws. On the main, Justice Chandrachud went past existing point of reference to hold that re promulgated statutes, as well as even mandates issued at the principal example, are liable to legal audit. Here, he put dependence on the observed S.R. Bommai case (1994), where a nine-judge seat of the court had decided that the legal could strike down an announcement of crisis when the power had been practiced by the official to secure a sideways reason.

Justice Chandrachud decided that a comparable standard of review could be connected to mandates as well; the court, in these cases, he held, won't enquire into the amplexness or adequacy of the material before the President or the Governor, however it can examine to check whether there has been either an extortion or a manhandle of energy conferred by the official.

In any case, solid as the court's finding is on the principal question, on the second its decision is possibly much more broad. Here, the court overruled two of its before judgments, and binned what it depicted as a hypothesis of continuing rights. It decided that a statute is unmistakable from an impermanent enactment, and it in this manner doesn't consequently make rights and liabilities that go past its term of task. "While ordering a law, the lawmaking body is qualified for characterize the period amid which the law is proposed to work," composed Justice Chandrachud. "... Hence, it lies flawlessly inside the domain and fitness of the governing body which authorizes a brief law to give that the rights or the liabilities which are made amid the residency of the law will subsist past the expiry of its term." But a law, not at all like a transitory statute, isn't an animal of the assembly. Hence, the court held, these requests have a similar power and impact of an enactment just insofar as they are operational. At the end of the day, once the conditions forced by Article 123 or Article 213, by and large, are infracted, the subject of what impacts will get by from the mandate should be freely evaluated. In such conditions, composed Justice Chandrachud, the court must look at whether the fixing of acts performed under a mandate would run counter to open intrigue.

Presently, while Justice Chandrachud is surely right in decision that a statute would not consequently make continuing impacts, a trial of open intrigue could demonstrate to some degree dangerous later on. There may well be situations where a law makes results that are clearly irreversible, notwithstanding open enthusiasm requesting its turning around. Notwithstanding, all things considered, these issues could well be resolved when consequent seats are looked with such inquiries.

In the last investigation, the court's decision must be viewed as putting a fundamental beware of what has as of recently been a power wildly misused by the official. Badly designed as authoritative level headed discussion and consultation can be, the governing body constitutes a basic establishment of our majority rules system. At

¹⁴ M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2003, p. 426.

the point when Parliament reconvenes one week from now, it must be seen by both the decision agreement and the resistance as a gathering for banter, for making laws in view of basic thinking. To anticipate the consummation of the session, and to make laws at that point by going around this procedure through law, degrades inside and out the Constitution and its finest standards.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether rights or benefits procured under a statute will survive the mandate is accordingly an issue for courts to consider on a case by case premise. Moreover, a statute that is issued over and over by a State Government or the Central Government with no endeavour to order a law fusing the terms of the law is probably going to be held invalid if tested in court. While all people are required to consent to a law while it stays in drive, there is no future assurance of any rights or benefits that are allowed under an ordinance; all moves made under a statute ought to be taken with due alert many acquiring fitting legitimate counsel. In a large portion of the cases Power of Ordinance making is a dubious subject and a theme of talk. It tries to irritate the harmony between the official and also authoritative powers by bringing into the component of assertion into the Constitutional System and aggravating the control of law. At whatever point such a mandate making power is practiced by an Executive body it demonstrates carelessness to the governing body. Till now just a couple of grounds are built up to challenge the legitimacy of the Ordinances: (a.) specifically damages a protected arrangement, (b.) president has surpassed his sacred power, (c.) President had made a colourable utilization of his energy. Power to promulgate Ordinances is a necessity for smooth and speedy functioning of State when applied in proper circumstances. In the wrong hand with wrong motive it can easily be turned in to a weaponry to bypass democratic features of Indian Constitution. Stable check and balance inculcating the spirit of Constitution is a requirement to prevent misuse of power by the executive.